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BLACKMAIL AND OTHER FORMS
OF ARM-TWISTING
LEO KATZt
What's robbing a bank compared with founding a bank? What's
murdering a man compared with employing a man?
- Bertolt Brecht, The Threepenny Opera

I.

CASES AND MATERIALS

"Poetry is indispensable," Jean Cocteau once said, "if only I
knew what for."' Nearly everyone seems to agree that blackmail is
an indispensable part of a well-developed criminal code, but no one
is sure what for.
The canonical blackmail problem is quickly stated. Busybody
says to Philanderer: "Pay me $10,000, or I'll reveal your affairs to
your wife." Busybody is guilty of blackmail. What is strange,
however, is that if Busybody had actually revealed Philanderer's
affairs, or if he had threatened Philanderer with doing so but not
mentioned the money, or if he had asked for the money but not
mentioned what he was going to do if he didn't get it-if he had
done any one of these things, he would not be guilty of any crime
whatsoever. Yet when he combines these various innocent actions,
a crime results-blackmail. How odd; how mysterious; how come?
It is easy, but wrong, to think that blackmail is essentially a
crime of information, that it invariably involves the threat to
disclose an embarrassing fact about the victim: "Pay me $10,000, or
I'll call on my men to strike"; "Pay me $10,000, or I'll flunk you on
this exam"; "Pay me $10,000, or I'll cause some really bad blood at
the next faculty meeting"-all of these pretty easily qualify as
blackmail, though none of them involves the threatened disclosure
of embarrassing facts. Quite possibly (though more controversially)
blackmail even includes cases like the following: "Pay me $10,000,

t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks are due not only to my
fellow symposiasts but to Northwestern University and the University of Virginia at
whose Legal Theory workshops I got to present drafts of this piece, and to Jim
Lindgren andJeffrie Murphy whose work first awakened my fascination with this
topic.
I ERNST FISCHER, THE NECESSITY OF ART: A MARXIST APPROACH 7 (Anna Bostock

trans., Penguin Books 1963) (1959).
(1567)
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or I will seduce your fianc6"; "Pay me $10,000, or I will persuade
your son that it is his patriotic duty to volunteer for combat in
Vietnam"; "Pay me $10,000, or I will give your high-spirited, riskaddicted 19-year-old daughter a motorcycle for Christmas"; "Pay me
$10,000, or I will hasten our ailing father's death by leaving the
Catholic church." Again none of these involves the threatened
disclosure of embarrassing facts. Yet all of the foregoing cases
present the canonical blackmail problem, as squarely as the more
typical, informational kind of case: It may be perfectly legal for me
to call a strike, to flunk you on your exam, to cause bad blood at the
next faculty meeting, to seduce your fianc6, to give a motorcycle to
your daughter, to talk your son into enlisting, or to abandon the
Catholic church. It is also legal for me to threaten any of these
things (so long as I don't ask for, or insinuate I want, money). And
it is legal for me to ask you for money, so long as I don't tell you
what unpleasant things I plan to do unless you oblige me. Yet it
isn't legal for me to ask you for money in exchange for not doing
those unpleasant things to you. In short, whether the blackmailer's
threat is one of disclosure or of something more exotic, the puzzle
remains the same.
It is also easy, but also wrong, to think that blackmail is
essentially a property crime. If Busybody had said to Philanderer,
"Let me make love to you or I will reveal your affairs to your wife,"
it would be blackmail just as much as if Busybody had asked for
$10,000. To be sure, some legal systems-notably the German onecall it blackmail if one asks for money but call it coercion if one asks
for something else. Similarly, the Model Penal Code calls it "gross
sexual imposition," a sort of quasi-rape, if one asks for sex rather
than money.2 But the history, decisional law, and scholarly
commentary about those alternative labels leave little doubt that
(the nature of the request aside) all of these labels refer to the same
underlying moral phenomenon, which I will consistently here call
blackmail.8
2 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2) (1974).
3 Consulting some typical blackmail provisions and their annotations should
quickly corroborate this-to the extent that any mere statute can corroborate a
proposition like this. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.4, 212.5, 213.1(2) (1974)
(covering theft by extortion, criminal coercion, and gross sexual imposition,
respectively); see also, e.g., STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] §§ 240, 253 (1974) (F.R.G.)
(detailing provisions in the German Penal Code covering coercion (N6tigung) and
extortion/blackmail (Erpressung), respectively).
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The canonical problem is a tough nut to crack, and most of this
essay will be devoted to cracking it. But there are other nuts in the
same bowl, which, oddly enough, few have bothered to reach for,
though they seem well worth the effort. Perhaps it is thought that
if the canonical problem cannot be cracked, it's no use trying the
others. Or, perhaps the contrary is true: The canonical problem is
so enticing that these collateral problems seem like mere. . . well,
peanuts. Either way, one is missing out on a considerable part of
blackmail's fascination. I do not in this essay mean to take up each
of these collateral problems-I intend to complete that task
elsewhere-but I will take up quite a few of them and make headway
on others.
What collateral problems do I have in mind? Here is a list of
the principal ones:
A. Warnings
Mildred and Abigail are both aspiring actresses. They are the
same age, look vaguely alike, and often find themselves competing
for the same part. Alas, Abigail tends to be much the more
successful of the two. Many a part that was almost Mildred's
ultimately eluded her when Abigail appeared to audition and was
found to be "justlike Mildred, only better." Mildred is, understandably, jealous of Abigail. One day a truly attractive part is being
offered. Mildred is convinced that if she gets it, it will make her
career. She is also convinced that she will only get it if Abigail stays
away from the audition, but Abigail has no intention to staying
away. Mildred is determined to keep Abigail away from the
audition, at any cost. It so happens that Mildred knows about some
of Abigail's marital infidelities, and she decides to put that knowledge to good use.
Consider now two possible conclusions to my story.
Variation I: Mildred calls Abigail and tells her that unless she
stays away from the audition scheduled for the next Wednesday
between nine and twelve in the morning, she will tell her husband

about those affairs. Abigail acquiesces, and Mildred gets her part.
There is no doubt that Mildred is guilty of blackmail.

Variation II: Mildred considers pursuing Variation I, but
decides against it. That would be straight-out blackmail, she
realizes, and therefore too risky. Instead she mails a letter to
Abigail's husband the day before the audition, detailing all of
Abigail's infidelities. She then calls Abigail to tell her the letter is

1570 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141: 1567
in the mail, is due to arrive the next day, sometime between nine
and twelve. "You can draw your own conclusions," she tells her. As
expected, Abigail then stays home to get a hold of the letter before
her husband can see it, and thus is prevented from attending the
audition.
Question: In Variation II, is Mildred guilty of blackmail? She
has committed what in substance seems like blackmail, but what in
form is just a warning. Does that make a difference? 4
B. Omissions
In the archetypical case, the blackmailer threatens an unpleasant
act unless paid off. What of the atypical case in which a person
threatens an unpleasant omission unless paid off? That begins to
sound very much like an ordinary bargain and therefore seems
outside the ambit of blackmail: Isn't this what happens in every
contract negotiation-one party threatens to omit performing some
beneficial deed unless suitably "paid off'? To avoid collapsing all
bargains into the blackmail category, mustn't we insist that blackmail only include threatened acts, not threatened omissions? Then
again, does it really make sense to so insist? What about the
potential employer who offers an applicant a secretarial job if she
will sleep with him? What of the American who offers to marry a
foreign heiress, unable to secure citizenship, if in exchange she will
fund some of his financial ventures? Or, the outgoing governor
who offers to endorse his aspiring replacement in exchange for a
financial token of gratitude? Couldn't these count as blackmail,
even though they involve threatened omissions? And, if you
wouldn't call them blackmail, is that really because blackmail
5
necessarily involves a threatened act rather than omission?

4 This is a much embellished version of a passing suggestion made by Guinther
Jakobs. See GfintherJakobs, NdtigungDurchDrohungalsFreiheitsdelikt,in EINHEIT UND
VIELFALT DES STRAFREcHTs: FESTSCHRIFT FOR KARL PETERS 69 (JIfirgen Baumann &
Klaus Tiedemann eds., 1974).
' Some have argued that such cases qualify as blackmail; some have objected. See,
e.g., HANS-HEINRICHJESCHECK ET AL., STRAFGESETZBUCH (1989); 2 STRAFGESETZBUCH:
LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR § 240, [81i (1974).
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C. Manipulative Crimes

-

Oscar implores Alonzo not to go on a concert tour to the Soviet
Union, in protest against the Afghan war. Alonzo is unrelenting.
Oscar threatens to destroy the one and only violin on which the
eccentric Alonzo is willing to play, unless he promises not to go.
Alonzo just laughs. Eventually Oscar sets fire to Alonzo's violin,
and Alonzo has to cancel his tour. Oscar's acts were not, of course,
spurred by the sheer joy of torching Alonzo's violin. No doubt he
is guilty of the comparatively minor offense of maliciously destroying someone else's property. But given the purpose of his actions,
is he not also guilty of blackmail? After all, had his threat succeeded in dissuading Alonzo from taking the trip, he clearly would be
guilty of blackmail. How can making good on that threat improve
Oscar's moral, and legal, position-especially when it secures for him
the very advantage which the threat was originally meant to
6
secure?
D. Buybacks
Anatole steals a Rembrandt from the Metropolitan Museum. He
sends a letter to the museum which reads: "Pay me $10,000, or
you'll never see that Rembrandt again." The museum buys back its
painting for $10,000. Anatole clearly is guilty of theft for taking the
Rembrandt. But what about the second transaction? Is it a simple
sale (as one German court held) or blackmail? ("Pay me $10,000, or
else .. ." certainly sounds like blackmail.)

More generally, is

Anatole morally better or worse for not having held on to that
painting, but instead having sold it back for a fraction of its market
7
price?
E. Self-sacrifice
Matilda sits down in front of a train and refuses to move until
the railroad administration promises to provide better facilities for
the disabled. Leopold threatens to jump out the window if his wife
makes good on her plans to leave him. Genoveve threatens to kill
6 See Ulrich Sommer, Lfiecken im Strafrechtsschutz des § 240 StGB? Zum VerhtjUnis
von Gewalt und Drohung bei der Ndetigung, 38 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRiFr
[NJW] 769-72 (1985).

7 This example is based upon a German case. See Judgment of May 18, 1976,
BGH Gr. Sen. St., 26 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen
[BGHSt] 346 (F.R.G.).
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herself unless her boyfriend pays off her gambling debts. Ferdinand
goes on a hunger-strike and demands that the state reverse his
"unjust conviction and lets me out of jail." Are Matilda, Leopold,
Genoveve, and Ferdinand guilty of blackmail?
Angelica, a pedestrian, wants to reserve a parking space for her
friend who is due to arrive imminently. Boniface has his eyes on
the same spot. As he tries to drive his car into the empty space,
Angelica plants herself squarely in front of him and announces:
"Over my dead body."
"You're kidding," replies Boniface, "you are threatening to die
for the sake of a parking space?"
"Exactly."
"Well, I won't be blackmailed. I'm going to park here anyway."
"You mean you are threatening to run me over with your car
unless I move?"
"Exactly."
"Well, I won't be blackmailed. I'm staying."
Thereupon Boniface drives in, and Angelica jumps aside at the
last minute.
Is Boniface guilty of blackmail? Is Angelica guilty of attempted
blackmail? ("Attempted" because she didn't get what she wanted.)
If the examples in this category seem altogether too contrived,
let me assure you that they are not. Each corresponds to a line of
cases that has regularly plagued German criminal courts-though
admittedly much more rarely American ones. Indeed the problem
they illustrate has a very venerable lineage, going back all the way
to Homer, namely the story of how Odysseus was persuaded to join
the Trojan War:
Now, Odysseus had been warned by an oracle: "Ifyou go to Troy,
you will not return until the twentieth year. and then alone and
destitute." He therefore feigned madness, and Agamemnon,
Menelaus, and Palamedes found him wearing a peasant's felt cap
shaped like a half-egg, ploughing with an ass and ox yoked
together, and flinging salt over his shoulder as he went. When he
pretended not to recognize his distinguished guests, Palamedes
snatched the infant Telemachus from Penelope's arms and set him
on the ground before the advancing team. Odysseus hastily reined
them in to avoid killing his only son and, his sanity having thus
been established, was obliged to join the expedition 8

8 2 ROBERT GRAvEs, GREEK MYTHS 279 (1955).
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What's more, Odysseus subsequently uses a similar ruse to
persuade Achilles to join the expedition. Achilles' mother, Thetis,
had been foretold
that her son would never return from Troy if he joined the
expedition, since he was fated either to gain glory there and die
early, or to live a long but inglorious life at home. She disguised
him as a girl, and entrusted him to Lycomedes, king of Scyros..
• Odysseus, Nestor and Ajax were sent to fetch Achilles from
Scyros, where he was rumored to be hidden. Lycomedes let them
search the palace, and they might never have detected Achilles,
had not Odysseus laid a pile of gifts-for the most part jewels,
girdles, embroidered dresses and such-in the hall, and asked the
court-ladies to take their choice. Then Odysseus ordered a sudden
trumpet-blast and clash of arms to sound outside the palace and,
sure enough, one of the girls stripped herself to the waist and
seized the shield and spear which he had included among the gifts.
It was Achilles, who now promised to lead his Myrmidons to
9
Troy.
Did Palamedes not blackmail Odysseus into reining in his team?
For that matter, did he not blackmail him into coming to Troy? Did
not Odysseus, in turn, blackmail Achilles into revealing his identity
and into coming to Troy?
F. Brutal Honesty
Hortense knows that Thaddeus has been unfaithful to his wife
and corrupt in his management of a trust, both of which she firmly
plans to reveal unless Thaddeus pays her off. When she first
demands money from Thaddeus she only mentions the infidelity,
although she is determined to tell everything she knows if Thaddeus
is not cooperative. When Thaddeus won't budge, she decides to tell
him a bit more of what she knows and is willing to reveal. By this
last move, has Hortense made things better or worse? Has her
greater honesty improved her moral position, or has her increased
threat only aggravated it?10
Given the intricacy of my subject, it pays to be absolutely clear
about the order of business: In the next section I shall spell out
how blackmail is different from other kinds of coercion and what

910id.at-280-81.
See Woody Allen's

CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS.
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problems attempts to reduce it to more traditional kinds of coercion
have run into.
In the third and fourth sections, really the centerpiece, I
introduce and solve a puzzle about punishment, which I believe
holds the key to cracking blackmail. In the fifth section, I apply the

punishment puzzle's lessons to blackmail proper, and in the sixth
and seventh sections answer some possible objections to my analysis.
In the eighth section, I sketch out some implications my analysis
might have outside the blackmail context-for the distinction
between tort and criminal law, for the problem of unconstitutional

conditions, and for "nuclear blackmail." Finally, in the ninth
section, I put my solution into a slightly broader perspective.
II. BLACKMAIL IN RELATION TO "PLAIN VANILLA" COERCION
Blackmail is only one kind of coercion; the law recognizes many
other kinds. But those other kinds are far easier to understand than
blackmail and it is important to see why.
The easiest kind is exemplified by "Your money or your life"the coercion exerted in a straightforward robbery. For the sake of
clarity, it is worth asking even of this trivial kind of coercion, why
we call it "coercion." Why do we not view the transaction between
robber and victim as just another bargain, one in which the chance
to continue living is exchanged for cash? In other words, what is
the difference between a threat-which is deemed coercive-and an
offer which is not? The answer is that offers enlarge your opportunity set whereas threats shrink it. The threat permits you to choose
which of many things you are entitled to you will give up. The offer
permits you to choose which of many things you are entitled you
will, if you want to, exchange for something else which you are not
entitled to. The robber coerces because he offers to sell you back
what he has first unlawfully taken from you-the chance to go on
11
living.
As Alan Wertheimer has shown with such extraordinary clarity
in his book Coercion, many seemingly harder cases are really just the
robbery case in disguise. 12 Ask yourself whether (and why) we
should reject the assumption of risk defense in this tort case:

11 A classic source in which the distinction between offers and threats is explored
is Robert Nozick, Coercion in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF ERNEST NAGEL 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969).
12 See generally ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987).
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A illegally blocks the public sidewalk, so that pedestrians can pass
only by walking in the street. In order to pass, B walks in the
street, knowing that there is substantial danger of being struck by
passing traffic. He is struck and injured by a negligently driven
13
automobile.
Did B assume the risk of injury and is he therefore barred from
recovering from A? Keeping in mind the robbery analogy, one soon
sees why the answer should be no. A illegally narrowed B's choices,
much as the robber narrowed those of his victim. A forced B to buy
back-by exposing himself to the risk of being hit by a car-something that was already his, namely the right to walk down the street.
Ask yourself whether (and why) we should accept a duress
defense in the following contracts case. Caterer agrees to cater
hostess's party. An hour before the guests are to arrive, caterer
raises his price by fifty per cent and refuses to start preparing until
the hostess consents. Hostess reluctantly yields. Thereafter she
refuses to pay, arguing that the contract modification was coerced.
Again, keeping in mind the robbery analogy, the answer is within
easy reach. The caterer forced the hostess to buy back what was
already hers-the right to have the party catered at the original
price. (Note that this problem would not disappear if the caterer
had thrown in some token consideration in exchange for the higher
price. It doesn't exonerate the robber any that he offered to
14
exchange his empty wallet for the victim's full one.)
Ask yourself next whether the following case involves an illegal
search and seizure. The police stop a traveller at an airport because
he resembles the Drug Enforcement Agency's courier profile. Stops
on the basis of such profiles have been ruled unconstitutional.
Notwithstanding this ruling, the police tell the traveller that unless
he consents to be searched they will detain him until they have
obtained a search warrant. The traveller consents. The robbery
analogy makes clear why his consent will be found coerced, and
hence invalid. The traveller was being asked to buy back (through
his consent to the search) what was already his: the right not to be
detained.
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E, illus. 5 (1965).
14 WERTHEIMER, supra note 12, at 95-103 (1987). Wertheimer's book shows with

great vigor and clarity how the underlying logical structure of the Restatement and
of cases dealing with coercive contracts, illegal searches, and plea bargains is in fact
identical. My illustrations in the first half of this section, and my interpretation of
those illustrations, borrow heavily from Wertheimer's book.
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Lastly, ask yourself whether the following plea bargain is valid
or coerced.
The prosecutor has inadmissible but conclusive
evidence demonstrating that the defendant is guilty of murder. He
also has admissible but flimsy evidence implicating him in a rape.
The prosecutor does not believe the defendant committed the rape.
Nonetheless, desperate to put someone he knows to be a murderer
in jail, he threatens the defendant with a rape prosecution unless he

pleads guilty to some lesser charge (let's say, the aggravated battery
of the fellow he murdered). The fearful defendant consents. But
his consent is no more valid than the robbery victim's. The
defendant is being asked to buy back (by pleading guilty to
aggravated battery) relief from a trial, which the prosecutor is not
entitled to launch anyway (given the frivolousness of the rape
charge).
Fundamentally, then, the foregoing cases of coercion are quite
straightforward. To be sure, they can give rise to greater conceptual
difficulties than I have let on so far. Not everyone who is pressured
into accepting a contract modification can claim duress-we don't
always find the robbery analogy compelling-but it's not quite clear
who can and who cannot. Generally speaking, though, there is little
doubt about what is coercive and immoral in the standard cases of
coercion. The standard cases all involve impermissible boundarycrossings. They involve easily discernible invasions of that line
surrounding each individual-Nozick calls it a hyper-plane'-which
harbors his possessions, entitlements, and rights. Blackmail isn't
like that. Admittedly, blackmail superficially resembles robbery, but
only superficially. For the robber's wrong-his boundary-crossing-is
easy to pinpoint. He sells back what he doesn't own, the victim's
life and limb. Not so the blackmailer threatening to disclose the
victim's infidelity. The victim doesn't own the right to control the
blackmailer's communications with his wife; the blackmailer does.
The blackmailer, unlike the robber, is selling something he owns.
Or so it seems.
But if blackmail isn't like standard cases of coercion, if it doesn't
involve boundary-crossings, what's wrong with it? A number of
scholars have offered ingenious suggestions seeking to supply the
missing link between standard cases of coercion and blackmail. I
will take a look at a small sample of those just to give a sense of the
sort of difficulties such approaches run into. 16 In an essay called
15

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 57 (1974).

16

What follows is not intended as an exhaustive presentation of all extant or all
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Blackmail, Inc., Richard Epstein suggests that what is wrong with
blackmail is that in various indirect ways it facilitates coercion and
other kinds of boundary-crossings, like fraud, embezzlement, theft,
and worse. 17 If blackmail were legal, he points out:
there would then be an open and public market for a new set of
social institutions to exploit the gains from this new form of legal
activity. Blackmail, Inc. could with impunity place advertisements
in the newspaper offering to acquire for top dollar any information with the capacity to degrade or humiliate persons ... or
business associates. Thereafter, Blackmail, Inc., as a commercial
organization, could negotiate contracts with its sources to suppress
the information acquired.' 8
And that would only be the first step.
[The victim] may not have the money to satisfy [Blackmail, Inc.'s
monetary demands]. What then is to prevent Blackmail, Inc. from
hinting, ever so slightly, that it thinks strenuous efforts to obtain
the necessary cash should be undertaken? Do we believe that [the
victim] would never resort to fraud or theft given this kind of
pressure, when the very nature of the transaction cuts off his
access to the usual financial sources, such as banks or friends, who
would want to know the purpose of the loan? ("To pay Blackmail,
Inc.," he would say in a burst of candor.) Moreover, suppose
Blackmail, Inc. recognizes that its ability to extract future payments from [the victim] depends upon [the third party, the wife,
the business associates, etc.] being kept in the dark. As it is a fullservice firm, it can do more than collect moneys from [the victim].
It can instruct him in the proper way to arrange his affairs in
order to keep the disclosures from being made, as there are
mutual gains from trade-greater wealth for Blackmail, Inc....
and greater serenity and peace of mind for [the victim]. What
Blackmail, Inc. can do is participate in the very fraud that [the
victim] is necessarily engaged in against [a third party]. 19
In short, blackmail is wrong because it promotes standard forms of
coercion and boundary-crossing in two different ways. First, it
facilitates fraud against the person from whom the blackmail victim
notable theories of blackmail, but only a smattering of those that try to assimilate it
to traditional notions of coercion. For a superb discussion of most of the competing
approaches-I say "most" because the Germans have invented a few more variationssee James Lindgren, Unravelingthe Paradoxof Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670,680-

701 (1984).

17 See Richard Epstein, Blackmai4 Inc., 50 U. CIii. L. REV. 553, 565 (1983).
'8 Id. at 562-63.
19 Id. at 564.
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is trying to keep some embarrassing fact secret; and second, like
drug addiction, it induces crimes necessary to support the "fraud
habit," the crimes necessary to pay the blackmailer.
In his prediction that legalizing blackmail would usher forth
organizations like Blackmail, Inc., Epstein has clearly been proven
right. When the blackmail prohibition is only laxly enforced,
organizations like this have indeed made their appearance. In finde-si~cle Paris, someone did form a limited-subscription newspaper
called The Independent whose exclusive purpose was to sniff out
scandalous facts about wealthy targets and make them buy the
20
newspaper's silence.
But Epstein's analysis nonetheless has serious problems. One
such problem is that the analysis is so specifically tailored to
informational blackmail and cannot easily be extended to the
noninformational examples cited in the last section-the threat to
call a strike, to cause bad blood at the faculty meeting, to give the
blackmail victim's daughter a motorcycle, or to persuade his son to
enlist.
A second problem with Epstein's account is its assumption that
whenever a victim tries to hide an embarrassing fact about himself,
this amounts to a form of fraud and should be prevented. Is the
reason we are upset with the blackmailer who promises not to reveal
a fellow employee's homosexuality (for a fee) that we would in fact
like him to tell the employer what he knows?
A third problem is that Epstein's account makes the blackmail
prohibition dependent on certain (admittedly very plausible)
empirical assumptions about blackmail's second-order effects on the
crime rate: More people will embezzle their employers, defraud
their customers, cheat the IRS, in order to pay off Blackmail, Inc.
But those effects seem to have nothing to do with our instinctive
revulsion at the practice: Even if we imagine that those secondorder effects are going to be trivial-to-nil, our aversion to blackmail
doesn't seem to wane one bit.
In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick finds a different kind
21
of link between blackmail and the standard forms of coercion.
"If I buy a good or service from you, I benefit from your activity; I
am better off due to it, better off than if your activity wasn't done
or you didn't exist at all." 22 On the other hand, "if I pay you for
20 See HANS VON HENTIG, DIE ERPREsSUNG 197-98 (1959).
21 See NOzIcK, supra note 15, at 84.
22

id.
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not harming me, I gain nothing from you that I wouldn't possess if
either you didn't exist at all or existed without having anything to
do with me." 23 Roughly speaking, then, Nozick sees the critical
line between ordinary bargains and coercive kinds of bargains (i.e.,
your-money-or-your-life kinds of bargains) as lying in the answer to
the question whether the alleged victim would be better off if the
defendant weren't around. By that test, blackmail starts to look like
standard forms of coercion. Like victims of your-money-or-your-life
transactions, and unlike a party to a regular contract, the blackmail
victim, it seems, would be better off if the defendant didn't exist. 24
Nozick's theory of blackmail, however, is both overinclusive and
underinclusive. It sweeps into the blackmail category a lot of
perfectly innocent conduct: The silver medalist at the Olympics
would be better off if the gold medalist didn't exist. A more serious
shortcoming is his theory's underinclusiveness. It covers only the
kind of blackmail in which the blackmailer promises to omit an act
in return for a payoff; it does not cover the kind of blackmail in
which the blackmailer promises to perform some beneficial act in
return for the payoff. (Only in promised-omission cases will it be
true that the victim would be better off if the blackmailer didn't
exist.) Although the most commonly thought of kinds of blackmail
cases do involve omissions, this-as I hinted in the last section and
will demonstrate in the pages to come-does not hold for all
blackmail cases.
In the course of his magisterial four-volume exploration of The
Moral Limits of the CriminalLaw, Joel Feinberg tries to forge yet a
different sort of link between blackmail and standard forms of
coercion. 25 Reduced to its bare essence-which is hard, because he
develops his theory with admirable detail-Feinberg's approach
amounts to this: All cases of blackmail can be divided up into two
categories, cases in which the blackmailer threatens to do something
which only an immoral (even if not criminal) person would do ("Pay
me $10,000, or I will let everyone know about your homosexuality")
and cases in which he promises to do something which only an
immoral (even if not criminal) person would do ("Pay me $10,000,
and I won't tell the police that you are the one who has been
sending arson threats to the new neighbor on the block"). 26 The
2

3id.

24 See id. at 85.
25 SeeJOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 238-74 (1988).

26 Id. This is only one of two theories of blackmail Feinberg advances. The other
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blackmailer is thus the pale version of either a robber or a criminal
accomplice. Either he is asking the victim to buy back what the
victim, morally speaking, already owns, like the right to keep his
homosexuality secret, or he is offering the victim his assistance in
keeping his misdeeds secret, like the torching of the new neighbor's
house.
Like Nozick's, Feinberg's account seems both overinclusive and
underinclusive. How is it overinclusive? Take the case of a contract
killer. He is promising to do something immoral in return for a fee.
Feinberg's account would brand him a blackmailer. But that seems
hardly the right label. How is Feinberg's account underinclusive?
Just take the canonical case-"Pay me $10,000 or I'll reveal your
affairs to your wife." Feinberg argues that because revealing the
husband's affairs to his spouse is only the mildest kind of wrong, he
would tend to exclude it from the blackmail category. Yet that kind
of scenario is viewed by many as the quintessential blackmail case.
In Unraveling the Paradoxof Blackmail,James Lindgren tries to
assimilate blackmail into standard forms of coercion by expanding
the category of personal property that an outsider is not permitted
to infringe upon. 27 His theory is best illustrated by informational
blackmail:
Here the blackmailer threatens to tell others damaging information about the blackmail victim unless the victim heeds the
blackmailer's request, usually a request for money. The blackmailer obtains what he wants by using extra leverage. But that
leverage belongs more to a third person than to the blackmailer.
The blackmail victim pays the blackmailer to avoid involving third
parties; he pays to avoid being harmed by persons other than the
blackmailer. When the reputation of a person is damaged, he is
punished by all those who change their opinion of him. They may
"punish" him by treating him differently or he may be punished
merely by the knowledge that others no longer respect him.
Thus when a blackmailer threatens to turn in a criminal unless
paid money, the blackmailer is bargaining with the state's chip.
The blackmail victim pays to avoid the harm that the state would
inflict; he pays because he believes that he can thereby suppress
the state's potential criminal claim.... Likewise, when a blackmailer threatens to expose damaging but noncriminal behavior
unless paid money, he is also turning third-party leverage to his
own benefit. What makes his conduct blackmail is that he

is based on exploitation. See id. at 240.
27 See Lindgren, supra note 16, at 672-73.
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interposes himself parasitically in an actual or potential dispute in
which he lacks a sufficiently direct interest. What rights has he to
make money by settling other people's claims?
At the heart of blackmail, then, is the triangular nature of the
transaction, and particularly this disjunction between the blackmailer's personal benefit and the interests of the third parties
whose leverage he uses. In effect, the blackmailer attempts to gain
an advantage in return for suppressing someone else's actual or
potential interest. The blackmailer is negotiating for his own gain
with someone else's leverage or bargaining chips.28
Lindgren's theory pretty closely matches our intuitions at the
descriptive level, although it seems perhaps a bit underinclusive. It
does not, for instance, account for several cases which many would
agree clearly reek of blackmail: Pay me $10,000-or I will cause bad
blood at our club, seduce your fiance, persuade your son to enlist,
give your daughter a motorcycle, or leave the Catholic Church. In
none of these cases is it easy to see in what sense the perpetrator is
playing with somebody else's bargaining chips. Even if it is
plausible to say that the blackmailer who threatens to reveal the
victim's infidelities is somehow misappropriating compensation that
is really due the injured wife, it is not plausible to say about my
other cases that the blackmailer is misappropriating compensation
that is really due the annoyed club members, the jilted fiance, the
patriotic son, the risk-loving daughter, or the sick father.
A more bothersome aspect of Lindgren's theory is its lack of
normative moorings. The bargaining chips which he finds the
blackmailer guilty of misappropriating seem like a very unreal sort
of commodity, made of the most diaphanous of tissues. It is hard
to see the principle that elevates this very metaphorical kind of
misappropriation to the level of a robbery.
I don't want to make too much of these criticisms. Above all I
don't want to make too much of the counterexamples. Counterexamples generally sound worse than they are. Just about every
important mathematical theorem when first set forth is vulnerable
to them, being too general or too simple in its initial formulation.
(Littlewood once defined the great mathematician as the creator of
defective-because original and important-theorems). In time, it is
revised, honed, hedged, and qualified in a process the philosopher
Imre Lakatos has aptly named "monster-barring." The initial
28

Id. at 702.
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theorem is eventually revealed to have been all wrong but basically
sound.
Indeed I believe none of the above theories to be just plain
wrong. There is much that is right about every single one of them.
Despite the problems that afflict them, they cater to some very
strong intuitions, and they retain that intuitive appeal, even after
the problems have been pointed out. Most likely, each captures
some important aspect, some special case, of the solution to the
blackmail puzzle, and it would be a distinct virtue of any new
account if it managed to reveal that to be so: It is pretty clear that
a good theory of blackmail should, for example, explain why the
typical blackmail case involves information and promises of
omission, why either the behavior that is threatened or the behavior
that is promised will typically be immoral, and why the typical
blackmailer appears to be playing with somebody else's bargaining
chips. I will try in this essay to provide such an account. Like
previous accounts, I don't expect this one to take us to the nirvana
of a compleat and incontestable solution, but levels of contentment
short of that are also worth achieving.

III. A PUZZLE ABOUT PUNISHMENT
One night, Smithy, the burglar, breaks into the house of
Bartleby. He finds very little of value. As he is about to leave, he
discovers a safe, which he is unable, however, to open. Wielding a
club, he wakes up Bartleby and asks him for the combination. But
Bartleby refuses to tell him. "Look here," says the exasperated
Smithy, "unless you tell me the combination, I am going to beat you
to a pulp." But Bartleby is adamant. "What's in that safe really isn't
very valuable. Just some cheap familyjewelry. But it has enormous
sentimental value for me, having been passed through the generations for ages. I simply cannot give it up." But Smithy persists:
"Tell me the combination, or I'll make you regret it." Bartleby quite
sincerely replies: "Much as I fear physical violence, I'd rather you
give me a savage beating than give up what's inside that safe." "As
you wish," says Smithy, and proceeds to administer a fairly severe
pummeling.
Another night, another burglar, let's call him Louie, breaks into
Bartleby's house. Like Smithy, he finds very little of value. As he
is about to leave, he too discovers Bartleby's safe, which he too is
unable to open. Wielding a club, he wakes up Bartleby and asks
him for the combination, but Bartleby refuses to tell him. "Look
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here," says the exasperated Louie, "unless you tell me the combination, I am going to beat you to a pulp." But Bartleby is adamant.
"What's in that safe really isn't very valuable. Just some cheap
family jewelry. But it has enormous sentimental value for me,
having been passed through the generations for ages. I simply
cannot give it up." But Louie persists: "Tell me the combination,
or I swear I'll make you regret it." Bartleby quite sincerely replies,
"Much as I fear physical violence, I'd rather you give me a savage
beating than give up what's inside that safe." "As you wish," says
Louie, and is about to launch into the beating, when his eyes fall on
a slip of paper lying at Bartleby's bedside. He takes a closer look
and realizes that this is the combination to the safe. He is about to
open the safe when Bartleby implores him, "Please, it's just like I
said, I am really attached to those trinkets inside the safe and would
rather you beat me to a pulp than strip me of those trinkets." Louie
remains unmoved, opens the safe, takes what he finds inside and
makes off.
Both Smithy and Louie are caught. You are the judge. Which
of them should you punish more harshly?
What the law would do is reasonably clear-punish Smithy, the
batterer, worse than Louie, the thief. The batterer would probably
be found guilty of aggravated robbery, the thief of simple robbery.
But that could vary. What is unlikely to vary is the significantly
graver treatment of batterers than thieves. But does that make
sense?
Informal polling among my law school colleagues, as well as at
a party of economists, suggests that it does not. What strikes most
as the most plausible solution is the following. Ordinarily, someone
who commits a serious battery is worse morally than someone who
commits a theft, especially a relatively modest one. But that's
because most victims prefer being stolen from to being battered.
Not so in this bizarre case. This defendant, for very idiosyncratic
reasons, preferred being battered to being robbed. Smithy did what
the victim preferred; Louie did not. Hence Smithy, the thief, is
worse morally than Louie, the batterer. There's a lot that could be
said to fortify this argument. For instance, one could point to tort
law and note that in a perfectly-run tort system, seeking to obtain
the most accurate possible measure of someone's loss, Bartleby
should be entitled to more compensation from Louie than from
Smithy. Although the tort system is a little wary of recognizing
excessively idiosyncratic tastes, it tries, by and large, to avoid
discriminating against the eccentric, the thin skull, or-as Calabresi
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shows in his essay on the "reasonable" tort victim-the devoutly
religious: 29 A Christian Scientist woman whose pelvis has been
shattered in an auto accident delays seeking medical care and
renders her injury irreparable;3° a Catholic woman refuses to use
contraception after a similarly serious injury to her pelvis and enters
into a life-threatening pregnancy;3 1 a Jewish woman is stalled on
a ski-lift, sitting next to a man, on Sabbath, and seeks to escape her
predicament by taking a disastrous leap to the ground. 2 We
deem all of these victims entitled to a full tort recovery, even
though their idiosyncratic beliefs greatly exacerbated their injuries.
Given all that, it would seem churlish to treat Bartleby's strong
attachment to his heirlooms any differently.
The recent tendency to consult victim-impact statements when
35
deciding on the death penalty further supports this conclusion.
Granted, victim-impact statements are controversial inasmuch as
they arguably ignore the most important victim, the deceased, and
give a disproportionate role to collateral victims, his family. But the
basic idea that victims need to be consulted in assessing harm and
meting out suitable punishment seems intuitively sound-as well as
consistent with the decision to punish the thief more harshly than
the batterer.
But the most important point in favor of the preference-based
view is probably this one: Harm is in the eye of the victim. The
very conduct that constitutes a crime or tort if done against the
victim's wishes is neither if done with his consent. If consented to,
the taking isn't theft, the intercourse isn't rape, the tackling isn't
battery, even the killing may not be murder. The absence of
consent seems like a crucial-a defining-attribute of harm.
Excepting odd cases like prostitution and drugs, what a victim wants
cannot count as an injury. It seems to follow almost inexorably that
even among bona fide harms, those the victim likes least are most
harmful, and those the victim can tolerate most are least harmful.
At least it seems that way.
29 See Guido Calebresi, The Beliefs of a Reasonable Person, in IDEALS, BELIEFS,
ATrrrUDES AND THE LAW 45 (1988).
So See id. at 46-48.
31 See id. at 48-49.
32 See id. at 51-52.
33 See e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment did not erect a per se bar prohibiting a capital sentencing jury
from considering victim impact evidence).
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But consider some of the more oddball consequences of the
preference-based view:
(1) A man is about to rape a woman. As he holds the knife to
her throat, the woman declares, "I would rather die than be
violated." Thereupon the man kills her. Or: Defendant kidnaps
victim, intending to hold him for ransom. Victim insists: "I would
rather die than be used for ransom against my family." At trial the
defense attorneys argue: "Ordinarily murder is a more heinous
offense than rape or kidnapping; indeed, it is the only one that
qualifies for the death penalty. In these cases, however, the victims
preferred murder to rape or kidnapping. The defendants, heinous
though their conduct was, did their victims a favor inasmuch as they
killed rather than raped or kidnapped them. Therefore their penalty
should be no more severe than would have been the case had they
committed rape or kidnapping."
I take it the argument would not persuade.
It might be objected, though, that this example proves very little.
We simply do not ordinarily take people's preferences for death
into account. But my hunch is that it is not this circumstance that
makes us resistant to the defense attorney's argument. Even if
death cannot ordinarily be consented to, it does tend to diminish
the guilt of the killer-assisting suicide or committing euthanasia
seem less heinous to us than outright murder.
(2) Assume the same facts as above, but suppose that the rapist
and the kidnapper, instead of killing their victims, proceed with the
rape and the kidnapping. At trial, the prosecutor argues: "Ordinarily, the death penalty cannot be imposed in cases of rape or
kidnapping. But this rape and this kidnapping, as far as these victims
are concerned, were worse than murder, and the defendants knew
this. Therefore, they should be treated with the same severity as a
murderer."
I take it this argument would not persuade either.
(3) Suppose Louie had not broken into Bartleby's house, but
rather into Bartholomea's.
All other facts remain the same.
Bartholomea, like Bartleby, declares she would rather be beaten
than give up the family heirlooms inside her safe. Louie, seeing
the combination to the safe on her night table, manages to open the
safe and to make off with the jewelry without ever laying a hand on
Bartholomea. Louie presumably should be treated just as he would
be if he had broken into Bartleby's house. Yet by punishing Louie
more severely than Smithy we are now asserting that the theft from
Bartholomea was worse than the battery of Bartleby. But the only
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thing of which we can be at all confident is that both Bartleby and
Bartholomea judge thefts of family jewelry to be worse than
batteries. We have no basis for thinking that the battery of Bartleby
is less painful to him than the theft from Bartholomea is painful to
her. For that sort of interpersonal comparison we have no data.
(4) Suppose Smithy had never been given a choice between
battery and theft. Upon not finding any valuables in Bartleby's
house, he simply bursts into his bedroom and administers the
beating. It is clear, however, that if he had noticed the safe,
Bartleby would have pleaded with him to beat him rather than steal
the contents of the safe. If this comes out during the trial, the
preference-based view suggests that we let the defense attorney
argue that since the victim in fact preferred what the defendant did
to something we would count as a lesser crime, the defendant
should only be punished at the level of that lesser crime. Indeed it
doesn't really seem to matter whether Bartleby's house actually has
such a safe in it. The mere fact that the defense attorney is able to
envision circumstances under which the victim would have preferred
what the defendant did to something else which would have rated
a lesser penalty should entitle the defendant to be punished no
more harshly than for that lesser crime. All this is suggested by the
preference-based view and it seems absurd.
If the preference-based approach generates such absurdsounding consequences, it must contain some logical flaw. But what
is that flaw? Before proceeding to lay bare the source of the
problem, I need to clear a preliminary difficulty out of the way.
From the very outset of this section, I have been pressing the
question, "Who deserves to be punished more harshly?" At more
than one point readers might have been inclined to say, "How
should I know unless you first tell me how one makes judgments
about deserts, whether one follows a retributivist, a utilitarian, or a
mixed agenda, or something else altogether?" I have implicitly
assumed retributivism to be the key objective of punishment, but
this is probably only a helpful, not a crucial assumption: Does it
make sense to seek such help? Does retributivism have any
plausibility? Yes, and a great deal of it, more, in fact, than any of
its best-known alternatives. It is, most familiarly, superior to a
simple utilitarian account of punishment, which would permit the
punishment of mere innocents for the sake of some utilitarian goal.
But it is also superior to the so called "mixed" account favored by
H.L.A. Hart, which permits punishment only when both retributivist
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and utilitarian goals are furthered thereby.3
Michael Moore
offers a simple, but compelling, hypothetical to show the inadequacy
of the mixed account.3 5 He asks us to imagine a robber-rapist who
has inherited a fortune, and had an accident that makes it impossible for him ever again to feel any sexual impulse.A6 Put differently, Moore creates a situation involving a heinous criminal whose
punishment would serve none of the usual (or even the not-so-usual)
utilitarian purposes-deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and
the like. (He deals with the problem of general deterrence by
arranging for a ruse by which the judge would only pretend to
punish. Agreement here is well-nigh universal that the defendant
should be punished nonetheless, revealing us all to be what Moore
3 7
calls "closet retributivists.")
Even if Moore's hypothetical has convinced you of retributivism's attractions, you may wonder how much solid content the
theory really has. Does it mean anything to say that a criminal
should receive the punishment he deserves, if we cannot tell how
much he deserves? Sure, we know that one week, two weeks, or
even three weeks is not enough for the robber-rapist, but whether
two and a half years is required, or five, or maybe seven and a half,
we have a hard time telling. Where should we look to find out what
is deserved? By contrast, utilitarianism superficially looks like it
offers an easy recipe for figuring out the right measure of punishment:
Choose the punishment that maximizes whatever the
utilitarian happens to value, whether it be deterrence, or rehabilitation, or maybe something else altogether. (Why that is just
superficial is nicely explained by Robert Nozick.) 38 Admittedly,
the executioners of past centuries had a pretty clear-cut sense of
what punishment each crime deserved: an execution that imitated
the crime. The robber who killed his victim by hitting him twice
with an iron spade was himself hit twice with that very spade, before
being garrotted. The servant girl who torched her victim's house
had her face scorched. The woman who cut her victim to pieces was
liquidated in similarly piecemeal fashion-first her throat was cut,

34 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 231-37-(1968).
35 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 241-43 (1984); see also Michael
S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE
EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
36 See MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, supra note 35, at 241-42.
3
7 Id. at 241-43; Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution,supra note 35, at 179-217.
38 NozicK, supra note 15, at 61-62.
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then her head lopped off, then her limbs wrenched out.39 The
aptly named Grimm fairy tales teem with such punishments. But is
this the only way to give concrete content to retributivism?
Psychologists have shown in an elegant series of experiments,
initiated by Thomas Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang's landmark study
The Measurement of Delinquency, that our intuitions about penal
desert are a lot more precise than our intuitions about those
intuitions suggest.4° In other words, we know more than we think
we know. Wolfgang, Sellin, and those who came after them asked
their subjects to rate the seriousness of various offenses by a variety
of means. Sometimes they just asked them to rate the offenses on
a scale of one to eleven. 4 1 Sometimes they asked them to compare
every offense to some standard offense and state whether it was
twice, ten times, or perhaps only one-sixth as serious as that
standard. 42 Sometimes they asked them to press a "dynamometer"
with the degree of intensity that best expressed how strongly they
felt.43 The initial results were reassuring although not completely
surprising: Subjects almost invariably rated as more serious those
offenses which we in fact punish more severely. 44 But there was
a fly in the ointment. If subjects deemed one offense two and a half
times as serious as another, the sentence the law gave the former
45
would rarely be exactly two and a half times as long as the latter.
Some psychologists worried: "Does the systematic deviation from
a linear relationship imply that, in our judicial system, punishments
do not fit the crime?" Having asked this question, they began to
realize that the analysis was missing a step.4 6 We have been
comparing the seriousness of crimes with the length of the sentence
meted out. We should instead be comparing the seriousness of the
crime with the seriousness of the sentence meted out. We should use
the very techniques we used to rate the seriousness of punishment
to then rate the seriousness of crimes, and see what we get. We
should ask subjects how they would score a three-year sentence on
9 See PIETER SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OF SUFFERING 73-74 (1984).
40

See THORSTEN SELLIN & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF

DELINQUENCY 268 (1964); see also GEORGE A. GESCHEIDER, PSYCHOPHYsICs 227-67

(1985).
41 See SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 40, at 248.
42 See id.
43 See GESCHEIDER, supra note 40, at 229.
44 See SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 40, at 262.
45 See GESCHEIDER, supra note 40, at 254.
46 See id.
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a scale of one to eleven and we should again have them press the
dynamometer with the appropriate level of intensity. All this was
done, and with great success. 4 7 It turns out that if one offense is
judged two and a half times as serious as another, chances are the
more serious of the two will carry a penalty that has been rated two
48
and a half times as serious as the penalty of the less serious.
Punishments fit their crime like a glove-admittedly, though, a storebought glove, not a tailor-made one.4 9 How dependent is my
analysis on the rightness of retributivism? Although a retributivist
view greatly facilitates it, most of what I say can probably be adapted
to alternative views. That is most obvious if you subscribe to a
certain version of the mixed view. For instance, suppose that you
think that punishment serves both deterrent and retributive
purposes, but that most punishments are as low as they are because
retributivism keeps them down. (We do not impose the death
penalty for drunk driving because retributivism forbids it, not
because it would not have a huge deterrent impact nor save more
lives than it would cost). Your view is then really equivalent to
retributivism within the relevant punishment range. But I am
convinced that even if you are an unreconstructed utilitarian, the
analysis I offer can readily be carried over.
IV. THE PUNISHMENT PuzzLE RESOLVED
So who should be punished more harshly, the batterer or the
thief? I have already made it clear that I think the preference-based
approach is wrong, that the batterer is indeed worse than the thief
notwithstanding Bartleby's weird preferences. But why?
Suppose you had the choice of living in either of two towns.
Town A harbors exactly one negligent person who happens to be
running a chemical factory. Given his habits and the consequent
odds of an accident, twenty people are expected to die as a result
of his negligence over the next decade. Town B harbors exactly one
vicious torturer-murderer. Over the next decade he will kidnap,
torture, and kill exactly one person-someone he comes to consider
his mortal enemy. Which of the two towns would you rather live in?
If you're at all like me, you prefer town B-the chances of dying
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 251-55; George A. Gescheider et al., PsychophysicalMeasurement of the
Judged Seriousnessof Crimes and Severity of Punishments, 82 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOc'Y
275, 275 (1982).
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seem substantially slimmer there. Which of the two criminals-the
highly negligent chemical plant operator, or the vicious torturermurderer-deserves the more severe punishment? Presumably, the
vicious torturer-murderer. (Indeed the parallel to the case of
Bartleby can be made even greater. Just imagine a defendant who
puts his victim to the choice: "I can either act the part of the
negligent chemical plant operator and thus cause some calamity
over the next few years or I can act as a vicious torturer-murderer
and kill exactly one person. Which would you rather have?")
This example makes clear a good part of what is amiss with the
preference-based approach: The victim's decision as to whom he
would rather be victimized by need bear absolutely no relationship
to the culpability of the perpetrator. The victim cares about only
one dimension of the perpetrator's activities-the expected harm.
In contrast, the judge-the criminal law-cares about harm only as
one among several criteria of culpability. Let me spell that out just
a bit more. An omission may produce as much harm as an act. The
victim certainly doesn't care much whether he was done in by an act
or an omission. The judge must: He will generally deem the
omission innocent and the act culpable. An intentional, a knowing,
a reckless, a negligent act-they all can result in the identical injury,
indeed they may result in the same probability of injury. (Remember that in my two-town example a negligently inflicted injury is
more probable than an intentional injury.) The victim couldn't care
less how it's done. The judge, however, must: He will punish the
former more harshly than the latter. A remotely caused injury can
be just as severe as a proximately caused one. The victim won't care
about anything other than severity. The judge, nevertheless, must:
Only if the injury is proximately caused can he convict. The
participation of an accomplice in a group crime may make no
difference to the outcome, because the group was already formidable enough to accomplish the task on its own. The victim won't
care whether the defendant added his mite to the effort. Yet again,
the judge must: He will punish the defendant's complicity even if
his efforts were perfectly redundant (and known by the defendant
to be redundant!).
Are we now in a position to solve the punishment puzzle? Not
quite yet. We may be confident that by and large-regardless of the
victim's preferences-intentional wrongs are worse than negligent
ones, act-produced wrongs are worse than omission-produced
wrongs, proximately caused wrongs are worse than remotely caused
wrongs, but do we have grounds for equal confidence that battery-
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inflicted wrongs are worse than theft-inflicted wrongs? In my twotown example it seems perfectly clear why the victim's attitudes are
not to be trusted: He takes no account of dimensions of wrongdoing other than harm. But where in the comparison of a battery and
a theft are there dimensions of wrong-doing that a judge should
take into account but a victim might not? What about the case is
analogous to the act/omission distinction or the proximate
causation/remote causation distinction?
A somewhat farfetched example will help us to find the analogy.
I have a diseased kidney and would like it replaced with a healthy
one. I am thinking about "stealing" one of two kidneys that have
recently become available for transplantation. I learn that the first
of those kidneys has just been implanted in a healthy recipient who
only had one kidney and wanted a full complementjust to be on the
safe side. (Let's assume my own needs weren't known yet when the
kidney was given to him!) The second kidney has not been implanted yet, but has been committed to another recipient with at least as
great a need for it as I. I am contemplating two courses of action:
(1) Stealing the "redundant" kidney that has already been
implanted in Recipient 1. Let us assume that removing the kidney
could be accomplished through a completely risk-free and painless
procedure.
(2) Stealing the yet-to-be-implanted kidney out of the refrigerator in which it is being stored.
Which course of action would be worse? Quite clearly (1) would be
the more heinous act. It is worse even though the victim of my
action in (1) suffers far fewer ill effects than the victim in (2). Why
is it worse? Because it is more invasivel But not because invasiveness entails greater risk or greater pain. What makes the difference,
rather, is that the rightful owner's claim on the kidney in (1) is far
stronger than the rightful owner's claim in (2). The claim is
stronger simply because it has passed into the owner's body.
Not everyone may be convinced yet. How do I know that one's
claim to things inside one's body (even recently implanted things)
is stronger than one's claim to things outside one's body, assuming
they are both important to one's well-being? Well, for one there is
the law of self-defense. You are entitled to defend your body in
ways you are not entitled to defend your property-even if the attack
on your property will affect your well-being far more than the attack
on your body. Note that this has nothing to do with paternalism.
It is not that we believe that you are silly to value something outside
your body more than your body itself.
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The prohibition of torture as a means of punishment bears me
out further. What exactly is wrong with torture as a means of
punishment? There is no doubt that many prisoners would prefer
or deem equivalent certain forms of torture to moderately lengthy
jail terms. After all, many us would submit to a fairly painful
medical procedure just to avoid being bedridden for an extended
portion of our lives. If torture is wrong, it must have to do with the
high degree of invasiveness associated with it. We all-criminals
included5 q--have such an extraordinary claim to the integrity of
our bodies that it cannot generally be invaded (except, say, for
medical treatment) even where other, more painful means of
punishment are appropriate.
The law of search and seizure is a natural extension of these
ideas. You have more of a claim to the things in your immediate
vicinity than to those further away, and thus are more entitled to
keep them immune from frivolous rifling. 5 1 That's not because
you in fact would mind it more if things in your immediate vicinity
were rifled through. It might very well be the reverse: You might
mind it far more if things outside your domain of privacy are being
touched. Nor is it the case that we respect your private things more
out of convenience, say, because it would be too hard to learn what
you most feared having idly rifled through and so we have a flat
rule. After all, even if you tell us what your preferences are we
don't abide by them. What counts is that your claim to noninterference is far greater as to things immediately around you than
to other things, regardlessof your preferences.
My point is worth elaborating in yet a different way. Suppose
a friend calls you up to tell you of a painful, but not especially
disabling, ailment which might be much alleviated with an experimental procedure that would cost her $2000. She doesn't have the
money; you do. You immediately offer to help her out, even though
she will never be able to repay you. An hour after talking, she calls
you back, thanks you for the offer, and says she would rather just
put the money in the bank or use it for a vacation, and go on living
with the pain. You ask her whether that means that the pain in fact
50

See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that a drug

conviction cannot stand given that the evidence was gained through forced extraction
of the drugs from the individual's body by use of a stomach pumping procedure).
51 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (holding that the

Fourth Amendment "may be understood as providing that an individual may not
legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in
the area immediately surrounding the home").
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isn't so bad, but she assures you that it certainly is. She just
happens to be the greedy sort: She would rather have the money;
or else she says she is the sybaritic sort: She would rather have the
vacation. Will you still give her the money? I suspect not. Butwhy
not? You don't doubt that the pain is severe enough to be worth
spending $2000 to alleviate. You don't doubt that she gets more
utility out of putting the money in the bank or spending it on a
vacation. She is your friend and you want to see her happy.
Nevertheless, you will think her claim upon you much greater when
it comes to health than wealth or vacation.
My example has a straightforward analogy in governmental
assistance for the poor. Many of us would rather grant aid-in-kind
than in cash. Not because we don't believe that the poor wouldn't
be happier with money, which they could, after all, spend on the
very things that aid-in-kind would otherwise give them. Not because
we are necessarily paternalistic and think we know better what is
good for the poor than do they. But rather because we believe that
they only have a claim on our providing them the particular things
usually granted as aid-in-kind: medical care, food stamps, and the
like.
Our tax system suggests a further analogy. It is often said that
the progressive tax system aims to equalize incomes, and that this
is a just aim. It is not usually said that the tax system aims to
equalize utility, or that that would be ajust aim. Is this perhaps an
oversight? Are we really trying to get at utility by way of income?
If we were, then we should want to tax Mother Teresa, Richard
Feynman, or Robert Penn Warren as heavily as some much-betterheeled but much-less-happy corporate executive. Without stopping
to explore why, I will take it as given that we would not want that.
Our approach to sentencing criminals offers me a final analogy.
It is often said that justice requires us to equalize the punishment
of those who are equally culpable. But that could mean either of
two slightly different things: It could mean equalizing their actual
sentences (jail time served) or equalizing their suffering. Since the
purpose of punishment is to inflict suffering, it may seem as though
equality of suffering is what we must ultimately be aiming for. But
if we were, presumably we would want to punish the happy-go-lucky
person, who tends to make his peace with his surroundings and to
find happiness wherever he is, more harshly than the melancholic
person who is miserable no matter where he is. Again, without
stopping to explore why, I will take it as given that we would not
want that.
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Let me remind you what these examples are meant to corroborate: Certain kinds of harms are to be objectively rather than
subjectively judged! Economists will find this very alien, although
a few philosophers and an occasional economist have made some
quite related points. Their focus, however, has usually been the
objectivity of benefits rather than harms. "The fact that someone
would be willing to forego a decent diet in order to build a
monument to his god does not mean that his claim on others for
aid in his project has the same strength as a claim for aid in
obtaining enough to eat," writes Thomas Scanlon. 52 And Ronald
Dworkin argues in a classic essay on equality that it is resources and
53
not welfare that the egalitarian should seek to equalize.
Even if you are by now persuaded of the fallacy of the preference-based view, you may be troubled by an example, like this:
Smithy breaks into Bartleby's house and finds two vases. He cannot
carry both of them off, and therefore plans to steal only one of
them. He is about to choose the vase he finds more attractive when
Bartleby, who has been witnessing the entire break-in starts to plead
with him: "Please do not take that vase. It's far less expensive than
the other one, but I happen to be much more attached to it."
Consider again two possible sequels to my story.
Variation I: Smithy says, "I don't care. I don't really want to
sell the vase, and I happen to like this one better. So, whether or
not it is the cheaper one, that's the one I'm going to take."
Variation II: Smithy says, "Fine. Although I would much prefer
to take this one, and exhibit it in my living room, as a small
concession to you I will take the other one and sell it."
Suppose that there are two theft statutes. One covering thefts
of small value, the other covering thefts of greater value. Should
the Smithy in Variation I really be punished less harshly than the
Smithy in Variation H? Our previous analysis with its objective
assessment of harm suggests as much. But can that really be?
I do indeed think it is so. The way to convince oneself is to
imagine that a week earlier Smithy'broke into Bartholomea's house
and stole an expensive vase from her. Presumably he should be
punished as severely for the theft of her expensive vase as for the
theft of Bartleby's expensive vase, since we have no reason for
52

Thomas Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 7 J. OF PHIL. 655, 659-60 (1975).
See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); see also THoMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 171 n.1
53
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thinking that she values her expensive vase any less than Bartleby
values his. It is true that Bartleby values his cheap vase more than
his expensive vase. But that doesn't mean that he values his
expensive vase any less than do ordinary folk like Bartholomea. To
put the same point more broadly: If we took the position that what
we are really after in assessing the wickedness of the theft is the
victim's subjective sense of loss, then presumably the theft of a
thousand dollars from a millionaire is a less serious affair than the
theft of the same amount from someone less wealthy. And that
would certainly seem odd.
V. BLACKMAIL PROPER
How does any of this help us with blackmail?
At first glance little. The punishment puzzle appears to be quite
different from the blackmail puzzle. The burglar puts his victim to
the choice of tolerating either one of two criminal wrongs. By
contrast, the blackmailer puts his victim to a choice of tolerating
either one of two things neither of which appears to be a wrong:
The payment of some money or the occurrence of something
unpleasant but perfectly legal. Nevertheless, the punishment puzzle
and the blackmail puzzle share this crucial attribute: In both
puzzles the defendant's accommodation of the victim's preferences
aggravates rather than improves his moral position. In both puzzles
the defendant is considered worse, not better, for having gone along
with the victim's choice. We now have a pretty complete explanation of why that occurs in the case of the punishment puzzle:
Culpability, and therefore deserved punishment, is only in small
part a function of harm, whereas the victim's choice between two
modes of defendant misconduct is exclusively a function of harm,
and therefore often at variance with deserved punishment. But can
that explanation somehow be generalized so as to account for
blackmail as well?
I think it can, and a small step is all that it takes. Consider the
buyback problem I posed earlier in this essay. Let me reproduce it
here:
Anatole steals a Rembrandt from the Metropolitan Museum. He
sends a letter to the museum which reads: "Pay me $10,000 or
you will never see that Rembrandt again." The museum buys back
its painting for $10,000. Anatole clearly is guilty of theft for
taking the Rembrandt. But what about the second transaction? Is

1596 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141: 1567
it a simple sale (as one German court held) or blackmail? ("Pay
me $10,000 or else ... "certainly sounds like blackmail."). 54
Morally and legally, has the defendant made things better or worse,
or has he pretty much left them the same by selling back the
painting? The German court decided on the last option, and viewed
the transaction as just a sale that pretty much left the defendant's
level of culpability where it was to begin with.55 Many people's
intuition, however, is likely to be that the defendant improved
things at least a little, because the victim (the museum) was certainly
made happier being offered the painting for a buyback than having
the defendant remain in permanent possessioi of it.
The punishment puzzle suggests another way of looking at the
buyback. Anatole is basically in the position of our burglar. He is
putting the victim in the position of our homeowner. That is, he is
putting the victim to the choice of tolerating one of two immoral
courses of action: Anatole's continued possession of the stolen
paintings or the theft of some money-the money the museum is
being asked to pay for the buyback. The museum prefers the theft.
The punishment puzzle taught us that this does not settle the
question of moral culpability. Just because the museum prefers the
second course does not mean the second course is less worthy of
condemnation and punishment than the first course. Indeed we
usually treat continued possession of a stolen good as not much of
an aggravation of the original offense, and we don't even give all
that much credit for the thief's return of the goods he stole. The
continuing possession seems to lack the moral culpability of an
additional theft. But an additional theft is what Anatole is in fact
committing in his deal with the museum. Thus his sale makes
things morally worse for him (much like the burglar's decision to
batter rather than steal). The treatment he merits, having completed the buyback deal, is that of a two-time thief, the first theft being
that of the painting, the second being that of the money he got in
exchange for it.
Let me put the matter a bit differently. It seems at first that the
buyback problem and the punishment puzzle are worlds apart.
Unlike the burglar, Anatole is putting the museum to the choice
between accepting Anatole's continuing noncriminal possession of
the painting or paying him $10,000. But with only a little effort one

54 See Judgment of May 18, 1976, BGH Gr. Sen. St., 26 Entscheidungen des

Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 346 (F.R.G.).
55 See id.

1993]

BLACKMAIL AND OTHER FORMS OF ARM-TWISTING

1597

can make that choice resemble the punishment puzzle. In essence,
Anatole is saying to the museum: "Allow me to commit a further
theft of $10,000 from the museum's treasury or else accept the
noncriminal wrong of my sitting forever on that Rembrandt." The
only detail that distinguishes Anatole's offer from that of the
burglar is that one of the threatened wrongs, the continued
possession of the stolen painting, is not, or may not be, criminal.
But since it still is a wrong, albeit a noncriminal one, the conclusion
derived from the punishment puzzle seems to still apply: When a
wrongdoer puts his victim to the choice between two wrongs, the
degree of blameworthiness is not much affected by the preferences
of the victim. Hence even though the threatened wrong is noncriminal, the level of blameworthiness is no less than it would be if the
threatened wrong were a criminal one-the level of blameworthiness
is determined by the wrong committed, not the wrong threatened.
Nothing about the fact that the threatened wrong is not criminal
seems to affect the logic of my argumentl
The broader significance of this point is that when a wrongdoer
threatens a victim with two wrongs and then carries out the greater
wrong, the degree of blameworthiness will not diminish as the
wrongdoer starts to diminish the threat. To be sure, there comes
a point when the wrong threatened is so minor that it no longer
counts. At that point the balance tips and the transaction between

wrongdoer and victim turns into a regular bargain with a level of
blameworthiness of zero. If for instance Anatole's threat to the
museum had not been to sit on the Rembrandt forever but merely

to be surly with the museum director, that threat too would involve
a wrong, but altogether too minor a one to turn the transaction into
blackmail. (Even if we assumed the museum director to be so
supersensitive that he might actually pay $10,000 to avoid being
insulted by Anatolel) (Does buying off surliness with money sound
like an absolutely preposterous example? Consider your motives for
giving money to a panhandler or a hotel concierge.)
We can now see the central problem with blackmail in a
different light: The blackmailer puts the victim to a choice between
a theft (or some other criminal encroachment) and some other,
minor wrong. The execution of the theft then carries with it the
level of blameworthiness of a theft. To be sure, the wrong must not
be too minor. The mere threat to be nasty or unpleasant won't
suffice; the immorality has to be more substantial than that. But it
need not-and this is the crucial point-be an immorality that comes
anywhere close to being criminal.
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A lot of otherwise puzzling things about blackmail now fall into
place.
A. The CanonicalProblem
Let's see how my account explains the canonical problem of
Busybody, who extracts $10,000 from Philanderer by threatening to
reveal his infidelities to his wife. Busybody is putting Philanderer
to a choice between two wrongs. Busybody will either commit the
theft-the unconsented-to taking of $10,000-or the revelation of
Philanderer's infidelities. Why is the payment of $10,000 unconsented-to, given that Philanderer is paying voluntarily?
It is
unconsented-to because it is made with the threat of something
wrongful, the revelation. But how is the revelation wrongful when
it is not in fact prohibited by the criminal law? It is wrongful
because it is immoral, even though not criminal or even tortious.
To be sure, it is not a major immorality by any means, but simply,
"swinishness." Indeed it wouldn't even be immoral if it had been
made out of friendship with the cheated wife. It is immoral only
because, if it were to be done, it would be done for purely retaliatory reasons-retaliation for Philanderer's refusal to pay. But now
comes the most formidable objection: If revealing the infidelities is
only a minor immorality, then how can the taking of money which the
victim prefers to that minor immorality be anything more than a minor
immorality itsel? That's where our solution to the punishment
puzzle comes in. The lesson of the punishment puzzle was that
when the defendant has the victim choose between either of two immoralities
which he must endure, the gravity of the defendant's wrongdoing is to be
judged by what he actually did (or sought to achieve), not by what he
56
threatened to do.

"6

Robert Nozick and Jeffrie Murphy have wondered whether it would really

constitute blackmail for a newspaper to suppress an embarrassing story if the victim
promises to reimburse them for the lost profits. Although traditional blackmail law
would probably count this as blackmail, many people's intuitions are with Nozick and
Murphy in discounting this as blackmail. The explanation for our ambivalence would

appear to be that running the story non-retaliatorily does not seem like a wrong.
Hence, to make money out of its suppression is not to make money out of a
threatened wrong. On the other hand, some would view even the printing of such
a story on a nonretaliatory basis as wrong-especially if it constitutes an invasion of
privacy-and so would want to deem the exchange of money for its suppression as
blackmail.
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B. Blackmail and "PlainVanilla" Coercion
The relationship between blackmail and more ordinary forms of
coercion like robbery now becomes clear. Blackmail is a form of
robbery in which the threatened action is itself noncriminal, indeed
often perfectly legal, but still immoral. Because we tend to thinkprior to thinking through the punishment puzzle-that the unconsented-to taking of another's property can morally be no worse than
the threatened action would have been, we think that blackmail is
unlike a straight robbery. Now that we know that the defendant's
moral status is determined not by what he threatened to do but by
what he actually did or sought to achieve (i.e., take money without
the owner's consent) we know that he is as culpable as a robber.
Well, perhaps not quite. There is this difference: The sincere
robber stood ready to commit a worse act than the sincere blackmailer. The robber, in addition to being guilty of a theft, is also
guilty of something akin to an attempted assault (or even murder).
The blackmailer, in addition to being guilty of a theft, is guilty only
of an attempted noncriminal immorality. And that makes him
altogether better. Marginally.
C. Omissions
I asked at the outset of this essay whether blackmail required the
threat of an act or whether it might also be based on the threat of
an omission. We can now see why it generally involves the threat
of an act but need not invariably do so. Since it requires the threat
of at least mildly wrongful conduct, and since even mildly wrongful
conduct usually entails an act, blackmail will generally involve the
threat of an act. On the other hand, there are omissions that are at
least mildly immoral: Not throwing the drowning stranger a life
vest is at least mildly immoral, though generally not criminal.
Hence, not surprisingly, it sounds like blackmail for the defendant
to say to the drowning victim: "Pay me $10,000 or I won't throw
you that life vest." In at least some jurisdictions, such requests have
in fact been criminalized-under statutory provisions that the
drafters usually recognize to be variations of blackmail. An example
is the German criminal code's provision on "Wucher" (literally,
"Usury") which covers defendants who "exploit[] the distress,
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inexperience. ... or the pronounced weakness of will of another"
57
for material advantage.
D. Sexual Favors
What about the employer who offers an applicant a secretarial
job if she will sleep with him? Most commentators tend not to
regard this as blackmail (as solicitation of prostitution, perhaps, but
not blackmail), but some would. What is being threatened in case
of noncompliance is a retaliatory non-hiring. Everyone would
regard such retaliatory non-hiring as being in extremely bad taste,
and a significant number would view it as downright immoral, even
if not criminal. Analyzing the matter in the now familiar style, we
could then say that the employer is putting the victim to a choice
between two moral wrongs-a retaliatory non-hiring or nonconsensual sex. If the retaliatory non-hiring is deemed sufficiently
immoral, then the sex itself will rightly be viewed as nonconsensual
in the same sense that Victor's giving up of his heirlooms is
nonconsensual. Thus if the sex occurs, it ranks in blameworthiness
somewhere near rape (which is indeed how some criminal codes
would classify it).
But, to repeat, this presupposes that the
immorality of the retaliatory non-hiring exceeds some de minimis
threshold (without however being criminal or even tortiousl). Our
uncertainty on this last point explains our uncertainty about
whether to treat such sex as blackmail.
E. Suicide
We are ambivalent on the question of whether the prisoner who
goes on hunger strike in support of some demand or other, or the
husband who threatens to commit suicide if his wife leaves him
ought to qualify as blackmailers. We are ambivalent because we are
ambivalent on whether the threatened wrong represents any wrong
whatsoever.

57 STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] § 302a (1974) (F.R.G.).
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F. Brutal Honesty

At the outset I posed the following problem, which I called
"Brutal Honesty":
Hortense knows that Thaddeus has been unfaithful to his wife and
corrupt in his management of a trust, both of which she firmly
plans to reveal unless Thaddeus pays her off. When she first
demands money from Thaddeus she only mentions the infidelity,
although she is determined to tell everything she knows if
Thaddeus is not cooperative. When Thaddeus will not budge, she
decides to tell him a bit more of what she knows and is willing to
reveal. By this last move, has Hortense made things better or
worse? Has her greater honesty improved her moral position or
only aggravated it?58

The answer I now propose to give to that last question is that her
greater honesty generally leaves the level of blameworthiness
unaltered, except to the extent that it increases the likelihood of
success. We now know that the blameworthiness of blackmail is
largely determined by the demanded advantage and not the threat.
G. PriorTheories

1. Lindgren
We can now better understand both the appeal and the
shortcomings of Lindgren's theory of blackmail: the argument that
59
blackmail involves playing with someone else's bargaining chips.
For Busybody to actually reveal Philanderer's infidelity to his wife
to settle a score with Philanderer is swinish; it uses the wife's
feelings as a mere tool to get back at her husband for not paying up.
Leveraging that threat to engage in such swinishness into a
substantial gain is as blameworthy as the flat-out misappropriation
of that gain. What is usually described as playing with someone
else's bargaining chips will invariably turn out to involve the threat
to commit some such swinishness unless one is paid off, and that
sort of leveraging we know to be wrong for the now familiar
reasons. It is thus that anything that passes Lindgren's bargaining
chip test will turn out to be blackmail. Which explains why
Lindgren's test, unlike so many of the others, is not overinclusive.
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

59 See Lindgren, supra note 16, at 702.
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On the other hand, not all threats to commit some kind of
swinishness pass the bargaining chip test. Threatening to encourage
someone's son to volunteer for combat duty in Vietnam is an
example of one that doesn't. Using that threat for leverage we now
know to be blackmail. Which explains why Lindgren's test is
sometimes underinclusive.
2. Feinberg

The virtues and defects of Feinberg's theory also become clearer
now. To the extent that Feinberg declares proposals that are rooted
in the threat of noncriminally wrongful conduct to be blackmail, 6°
we are now able to account for that as a straightforward consequence of the fact that blameworthiness is only partially a function
of harm. To the extent that Feinberg declares proposals that are
rooted in the promise of noncriminally wrongful conduct to be
blackmail,6 1 we are now able to see where he is correct and where
he is not. He is correct about such cases as the proposal to carry
out a killing-for-hire, because the threatened defendant "misconduct", the "retaliatory non-killing," is not really any kind of
misconduct at all. Feinberg is incorrect about such cases as the
proposal to withhold damaging information from the IRS, because
a retaliatory reporting of such information to the IRS, (i.e., the
reporting of such information not to help the government, but to
settle a score) strikes us as quite immoral, not immoral at the level
of criminality or tortiousness, but immoral all the same. Leveraging
such immoral conduct into a substantial gain then becomes
blameworthy at the level of theft.
3. Nozick
We can now see why Nozick's test for distinguishing blackmail
from other contracts works somewhat but not quite. His test was to
ask whether the victim would be better off if the defendant did not
exist. 62 In the case of an ordinary contract, the victim would be
sorry not to have the defendant around for a mutually beneficial
exchange. In the case of blackmail, he would wish for the defendant not to be around. Nozick's "existence" test is really a test for
whether the defendant is threatening to engage in an act or an
60 See FEINBERG, supra note 25, at 245-49.
61 See id.
62 See Nozick, supra note 11, at 84-86.
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omission. The test for distinguishing acts from omissions is this
very one-would the victim have fared any differently if the
defendant did not exist. Because most contracts involve the threat
of an omission ("I won't sell you X, if you don't pay me Y") and
most immoral conduct involves acts, a test simply distinguishing acts
from omissions is a pretty good proxy for figuring out whether we
are dealing with blackmail or not.
4. Epstein
Epstein's theory deems it crucial that blackmail involves the
disclosure of damaging information. 63 Clearly most blackmail, the
archetypical kind of blackmail, does involve the threat of embarrassing disclosures. We can now see why. Most immoral misconduct at
the noncriminal level is of an informational nature. If the misconduct is more tangible than that, it probably is a crime. If it is less
tangible than that, it falls below the threshold of serious immorality.
VI. AN OBJECTION
My analysis of Anatole's Rembrandt theft is apt to leave a
lingering sense of unease.64 Some of that unease is illustrated by
the following hypothetical: Suppose that what Anatole had stolen
were not a painting from a museum but a sack of money from a
bank, containing $100,000. Suppose further that after sitting on the
money for a while and thinking about spending it, he has second
thoughts. He sends the bank a note which reads: Promise to pay
me a reward of ten percent for the money I shall be returning, or
else you will see none of it ever again. The bank is only too happy
to agree. Anatole turns the bag of money over to them, and they in
turn give him a bag with $10,000. Under my analysis, he would now
be guilty of the blackmail of $10,000, in addition to the theft of the
$100,000. The reason that is apt to seem strange is this: Imagine
that rather than asking for a ten percent commission, Anatole had
simply removed $10,000 from the bag, and returned $90,000 to the
bank. Now he would be guilty only of the theft, and quite possibly
would have his guilt mitigated by the partial return of the money.
The fact that he got $10,000 out of it would not be considered to

I See Epstein, supra note 17, at 558.
64 1am indebted to Anthony D'Amato for helping to put this objection into focus
for me. I deal with problems of form and substance at some length in a book I hope
to have done soon, tentatively titled Ill.Gotten Gains: The Paradoxesof Theft.
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aggravate his guilt. How can the result be different if he returns the
money in exchange for $10,000, when in the end it really comes to
the same thing?
The question is an important and deep one. So important and
so deep, I do not have the space to answer it completely right here.
(I do provide an answer elsewhere). 6 5 I can, however, explain the
essence of why it in fact makes perfect sense to treat Anatole
differently depending on which route he chooses for returning the
moneyl The problem is really very much like that of Mildred and
Abigail. Here too we have someone-Mildred-committing blackmail
by different means, and the question arises whether it is just as bad,
regardless of the means chosen. My ultimate conclusion is that
Mildred is in fact not guilty of blackmail when she "commits"
blackmail by devious means-just as Anatole is not guilty of
blackmail if he simply takes $10,000 out of the bag and returns
$90,000 to the bank. The question is: How can form make that
much of a difference?
As I said, I cannot provide the full answer here, but I can
provide a sense of where the full answer lies. It is best conveyed by
thinking briefly about two cases made famous by the philosopher
Judith Jarvis Thomson, the "trolley case" and the "surgeon case."
The trolley of the trolley case is heading down a downhill track. As
the trolley is approaching a junction, the driver discovers some
unpleasant facts: (a) there are people on both of the tracks
emanating from the junction, and (b) his brakes won't work. The
driver now has two choices. He can let the trolley run, in which
case it will proceed down the track it currently is on and kill five
people. Or he can turn it onto the other track once he reaches the
junction (the steering wheel, unlike the brakes, still works) and run
over the one and only person who happens to be occupying that
track. Suppose he turns the trolley, kills the one, and thereby saves
the five. Has he acted legally? Opinions are nearly unanimous that
he has. Is that because he effectuated a net saving of lives? Not
quite, as the next case, the surgeon case, is meant to demonstrate.
The surgeon in the surgeon case has five patients all of whom
are at death's door. They will die unless provided with some
transplant organs. Two of them need new kidneys; two need new
lungs; one needs a new heart. There is no donor far and wideexcept for a perfectly healthy patient who walks into the doctor's
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office for his annual checkup. On seeing him, the surgeon realizes
that he is a walking reservoir of useful spare parts which, if
judiciously redeployed, could accomplish a great deal more good
than they currently are. The surgeon thereupon quickly euthanatizes his patient and harvests the man's organs for the benefit of his
five other patients. He has saved five lives at the cost of one. Has
he acted legally? Opinions are nearly unanimous that he has not.
So much for the preliminaries. Let's now consider a hypothetical that combines elements from both of the foregoing cases. Think
again of the unstoppable trolley. Imagine that the driver can't make
up his mind about what to do, and thus ends up running over the
five, rather than the one. Miraculously, he doesn't kill them, but
only hurts them badly. Nevertheless, they are certain to die from
their injuries unless furnished with certain transplant organs,
namely-2 kidneys, 2 lungs, and 1 heart. Suppose now the driver
deeply regrets not having turned the trolley, and announces: "It
would have been all right had I turned the trolley and thereby killed
the one for the sake of the five. I hesitated because I wanted to give
the matter more thought. Upon reflection, I have decided it would
indeed have been better to have killed the one to save the five, and
I want to make up for my earlier omission. The victim really isn't
entitled to protest: He is giving up nothing other than what I would
have been entitled to take from him anyway."
This is not a persuasive argument. There is no going back on
the decision to run over the five instead of the one. The mere fact
that by killing the one we would simply bring about a state of affairs
we were entitled to bring about minutes earlier does not entitle us

to do so now.
What this case is meant to demonstrate is that a lot can turn on
form. Doing the same thing in a slightly different way can have
major moral repercussions. It does so in my version of the trolley
case. It should now seem less shocking that it does so in the case
of Mildred and Abigail and in the Anatole variation with which I
began this section. That's not yet a full argument, but it rather
broadly hints at the nature of that argument.
VII. A FURTHER OBJECTION
One feature of my account of blackmail is bound to seem very
disturbing. As I describe it, the blackmailer puts his victim to a
choice between a taking and some other minor wrong. The taking
is then considered unconsented and carries a corresponding level
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of blameworthiness-that of a theft (if what was taken involves

property); that of a rape (if what was taken involves sex); that of a
kidnapping (if what was taken was the freedom to move about).
The threatened wrong, I kept emphasizing, need not itself be a
crime (hence the paradox of blackmaill), need not even be a tort,
indeed need not be anything more than a sufficiently grave piece of
obnoxiousness, which by itself would not merit legal intervention.
To be sure, I also kept emphasizing that this does not endow

blackmail with as sweeping a scope as first appears, because threats
of nothing more than garden-variety meanness wouldn't qualify. On
the other hand, although the threat has to be of something more
serious than garden-variety meanness, it does not have to be that
much more serious. And that makes for a very odd kind of offense:
As the defendant's threat edges up on, but stays shy of, some illspecified magical threshold, he is merely considered a crafty, nasty,
unsavory, slightly immoral negotiator.
Once he passes that
threshold, his blameworthiness suddenly soars into the stratosphere-soars, that is, to the level of a regular blackmailer. That sort
of radical discontinuity must seem both alarming and implausiblel
We expect the path between moral and immoral conduct to be
a pretty continuous one: As the defendant's conduct slightly
changes, we expect his moral status to only change slightly as well.
We don't expect a slight modification in someone's behavior to
result in a radical shift in his moral status.
The problem with sharp boundaries in ethics is well captured by
the joke about the Jewish boy who had a pathological fear of a dish
called kreplach, an envelope made of dough with meat inside. To
cure him of his fear, his mother had him watch her prepare a piece.
After she had flattened a slab of dough and shaped it into a square,
she asked him whether he was afraid. He said no. After she had
inserted the meat and folded over one of the four corners of the
kreplach-to-be, she again asked him whether he was afraid. He said
no. After she had folded over the second and third corners of the
nearly done kreplach, she asked him yet again if he was afraid. He
still said no. But when she folded over the last corner, the
peaceable expression on the boy's face suddenly changed to one of
horror. "Kreplachl" he shouted and ran off panic-stricken. 66 My
theory of blackmail seems to put us in a similar position vis-a-vis the
66 1 owe this joke, like 90% of my Jewish jokes, to the late Hans Zeisel. For an
inventory of the punchlines to the best of Hans'sjokes see Harry Kalven, Hans, 41 U.
CiHi. L. REv. 209, 211-12 (1974).
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tough negotiator. As he gradually increases the immorality of the
threats by which he seeks to pressure the other side, we keep telling
him that his moral status is only getting marginally worse. Then, as
he passes some boundary, we yell "Blackmailerl" By a single step,
we seem to be saying, the person has turned from a cad into a thug.
And that seems perverse.
To be sure, the law exhibits such patterns not infrequently: One
step shy of some critical line and you're safe; one step over that line
and you're jailbait. But we don't think that mirrors the underlying
moral reality. We think it simply results from the need to have clear
rules. Indeed the long-standing debate about the relative advantages of rules and standards is built on the premise that the moral
ideas and policies that motivate certain rules have tapered boundaries and that the needs of fair notice cause these tapered boundaries to be transmuted into sharp edges when laws get formulated.
My theory of blackmail, however, is itself a moral theory. If it gives
the prohibition against blackmail a sharp edge, that has nothing to
do with considerations of clarity or fair notice. Indeed, since I have
not been able to spell out exactly where that sharp edge is located,
the definition of blackmail that results from my theory manages to
be sharp-edged without being clearl Hardly a virtue.
We are right to be surprised when we find discontinuity in the
world around us, whether that be the moral, the social, or the
natural world; but we are not right to be astonished. We are
entitled to expect small causes to have small effects. But we are not
entitled to count on it. The philosopher Roy Sorensen aptly made
this point about the natural world:
An extremely tiny change in the velocity of an object can make the
crucial difference as to whether it achieves escape velocity and
travels far out into space, or fails to escape and crashes to earth
....
A difference of one proton, one neutron, and one electron
is responsible for the dramatic difference in the chemical properties of fluorine and neon. The question of whether the universe
will expand endlessly or contract in on itself turns on the issue of
whether the neutrino has appreciable mass.... A banana peel can
elicit spectacular acrobatics from a lumbering pedestrian.... and
one vote amongst millions can determine the outcome of a
67
presidential election.

67 RoY A. SORENSEN, BuNDsPoTs 251-52 (1988).
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In the same spirit, the physicist Emilio Segr6 is quoted in the
epigraph to Richard Rhodes's The Making of the Atomic Bomb as
saying: "All the committees, the politicking and the plans would
have come to naught if a few unpredictable nuclear cross sections
68
had been different from what they are by a factor of two."
Indeed at least one kind of natural phenomenon is notorious for
such discontinuities-human perception. Think of those legendary
experiments in Gestalt psychology, in which subjects swing from
seeing something as a duck to seeing it as a rabbit, from seeing
someone as a young woman to seeing her as an old hag, from seeing
the Necker cube bulge in to seeing it bulge out, from seeing two
dark faces against a white background to seeing a white wine glass
against a dark background, from hearing only one strain in a
musical canon to hearing only another, or (to borrow a quip from
Richard Posner) from thinking law and economics obviously false to
thinking it obvious.
Not just human perception, human learning more generally is
said to abound with discontinuities. The computer scientist Marvin
Minsky explains why:
[N]othing so complex as a human mind can grow, except in
separate steps. One reason is that it is always dangerous to change
a system that already works. Suppose you discover a new idea or
way to think that seems useful enough to justify building more
skills that depend on it. What happens if, later, it should turn out
that this idea has a serious flaw? ....
[One strategy would be] never to let a new stage take control
of actual behavior until there is evidence that it can outperform its
predecessor. What would an outside observer see if a child
employed this strategy? One would observe only "plateaus,"
during which there were few apparent changes in behavior,
followed by "spurts of growth" in which new capacities emerge
69
suddenly.
Social scientists have started to accumulate examples of such
discontinuities in the social world. The anthropologist Michael
Thomson offers an especially striking one-the process by which one
generation's rubbish becomes another generation's valued antique. 70 Commodities will gradually obsolesce into a state of

68 RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OFTHE ATOMIC BOMB 8 (1986) (quoting Emilio
Segr ).
9 MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 178 (1985).
70
See MICHAEL THOMPSON, RUBBISH THEORY: THE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION
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rubbishhood, where most of them in fact remain. But a few
formerly discarded items will suddenly regain value. They won't do
so gradually. Rather after a brief period of hovering in a limbo of
indeterminate value they positively soar out of the junk heap, their
price leaping from less than zero (because it costs something to
dispose of them) to Sotheby-levels.
I am inclined to offer the iterated prisoners' dilemma paradox
as another illustration. We know that although it is rational to
defect in a regular prisoners' dilemma, it will frequently no longer
be rational to defect if the game is meant to be iterated an indefinite number of times-there now being future gains to be had from
cooperating. The paradox arises because it seems that if the game
is slated to be played an exact number of times, say one thousand,
it now again becomes rational to defect. (It will be rational to
defect on the last game. Hence it will be rational to defect on the
next-to-last game; hence it will be rational to defect on the next-tothe-next-to-last game and so on to the very first game.) That makes
for a striking discontinuity between long-lasting games of indefinite
and definite length. Game theory is said to be full of such discontinuities. If it captures even a fraction of the amount of social reality
game theorists claim it does, discontinuity is really the order of the

day.
My most potent argument, however, against those who are
skeptical about such discontinuities in the moral world is to point
out that we already know it to exist at the moral heart of the
criminal law, the doctrines of mens rea. Take a look at the notion
of negligence. The most natural interpretation of negligence is the
"Learned Hand" formula: One is acting negligently if the costs of
one's actions discounted by their probability exceed the benefits
discounted by their probability. But if one does behave negligently,
blameworthiness will be measured by either the expected or the
actual harm, not by the difference between the expected harm and
the expected benefit! In other words, if a speeding driver runs
someone over and he is just one scintilla short of being negligentbecause the expected costs of his speeding are exactly one scintilla
short of the expected benefits-his conduct is morally beyond
reproach. But if the speeding driver is just one scintilla past the
point of negligence-because the expected costs of his speeding are
exactly one scintilla greater than the expected benefits-he is guilty

OF VALUE

(1979).
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of manslaughter. So the definition of negligence has a very sharp
edge indeed.
Consider next the mens rea of knowledge. To harm knowingly
is deemed appreciably worse than to harm recklessly or negligently.
Yet the transition between recklessly and knowingly bringing about
harm lies at some fairly precise point somewhere on top of ninety
percent, dubbed "virtual certainty." So again there is no gradual
shading of bad to worse, but rather a sudden jump from bad to
terrible.
There is a second kind of discontinuity involving the mens rea
of knowledge. Suppose someone falls well short of recklessness
because the appreciable harm he risks is outweighed by the
appreciable benefits he can expect. As the probability of the harm
rises past the threshold of virtual certainty the benefits suddenly
cease to count and blameworthiness soars from zero to a level
measured by the harm knowingly brought about. That is, the
defendant who takes a forty-five percent chance of losing a life in
exchange for the certain rescue of two other lives has not killed
recklessly if someone should die. But the defendant who takes a
ninety percent (i.e., two times forty five percent) chance of losing
a life in exchange for the certain rescue of four (i.e., two times two)
other lives has committed a murder for the sake of saving four other
lives, something that we usually do not permit.
Consider, finally, intention. If the defendant intends to kill
someone by an act that has an extremely small probability of
succeeding (such as giving his victim an airplane ticket in the hope
that the plane he takes will crash), he is not guilty of murder even
if his victim dies. 7 1 But as the probability rises, while still staying
well short of the substantial level required for negligence (not to
mention recklessness or knowledge) it will reach a point where,
combined with the hope of death, it makes for an intentional killing.
Thus the defendant's culpability rather suddenly jumps from zero
to murder, without ever traversing the intermediate levels of a
negligent or reckless killing.
Once one starts looking for them, the moral world seems to
abound with such discontinuities. Our attitudes towards death seem
to display them. We know the passage into death to be a fairly
continuous process involving a gradual cessation of a variety of lifesustaining functions. The dying person becomes increasingly less
71
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life-like and increasingly more corpse-like. But the dying person's
rights do not change so continuously. Very little in the way of
bodily invasion can be committed against someone just at death's
door; however, nearly everything can be done to him just past that
point.
One final example. Think about the sort of loyalty alumni feel
vis-a-vis their alma mater. Imagine that a part of the University of
Pennsylvania were to break off, migrate to Valley Forge and call
itself Valley Forge University.
Valley Forge University would
command next to none of the old Penn alumni's loyalty and
financial support. But suppose we gradually increase the number
of faculty who migrate from the University of Pennsylvania to Valley
Forge University and, in fact, start to move some crucial parts of the
physical plant-the Ben Franklin sculpture, the portal to the law
school, the Palestra. There surely would come a point where Valley
Forge University would come to be viewed as the proper continuation of the University of Pennsylvania. Moreover, it would be pretty
much a point, not an interval. Relatively suddenly nearly all alumni
would shift their allegiances from the place in Philadelphia to the
place in Valley Forge. It would not be the case that as the place in
Philadelphia started to look less and less like the old Penn and the
place in Valley Forge started to look more and more like the old
Penn allegiances would gradually drift. The change would be a
discontinuous one.
What this survey is meant to show is that discontinuities of the
kind exhibited by my account of blackmail are unusual enough to
be interesting but not so unusual as to be incredible.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS, RAMIFICATIONS, SPECULATIONS
What follows is a loose and unsystematic list of areas outside the
blackmail context in which my analysis may have implications.
A. Crimes Versus Torts
Criminal law is often described as a tort law for the poor
defendant, a means of controlling the conduct of the judgmentproof sinner. Criminal punishment is viewed as the analogue to
damages. Occasionally it is noted that criminal law systematically
covers some forms of conduct that the tort law systematically
slights-such as mere attempts. Our analysis of blackmail-especially
of the preference-based fallacy that preceded it-allows us to make
out a more fundamental difference. In tort, unlike criminal law,
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Smithy, the batterer, should pay less than Louie, the thief, since
Bartleby presumably lost less from the battery than from the theft.
In tort, unlike criminal law, the vicious torturer-murderer should
pay less than the negligent factory operator, since he killed many
fewer people. What this dramatizes is that although the same
conduct will often trigger both tort and criminal liability, the
severity of the two forms of liability need not be commensurate.
Although both tort and criminal law care about fault, tort law only
uses it to determine whether the defendant is liable, not how heavy
that liability should be. The heaviness of tort liability is governed
by just one criterion, the seriousness of the harm, the damage done.
Criminal law, by contrast, uses fault not merely to determine
whether, but also to determine how severely, to punish. Harm still
plays a role, but it has to share the limelight with fault. (Of course,
when the gap between penal and tort desert gets too large, we
become queasy. That's when punitive damages most seem in order.)
We are now, incidentally, better able to see what it means to
criminalize an area of misconduct. It means not so much replacing
private suits with public ones and damage awards with the assessment of fines, as it means keying the penalty structure to fault: to
make it sensitive to the presence of intention as opposed to mere
recklessness; to make it encompass not just completed offenses but
also attempts; and to make it distinguish between degrees of
complicity, between being a principal and being an accessory.
B. UnconstitutionalConditions
The greater-includes-the-lesser is one of the most familiar of
legal arguments and one of the most suspect. It is especially suspect
in constitutional law and sharp constraints are put on its deployment by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
More
concretely: The government frequently imposes special burdens
and restrictions on those who receive some governmental benefit (a
subsidy, a job), burdens which the constitution bars it from
imposing on just anyone. Those who object meet with the-greaterincludes-the-lesser argument: The government is not obligated to

give you this job at all. Afortiori it can give you that job subject to
certain conditions. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions says

that sometimes that argument is unacceptable.

Unfortunately no

one has clearly articulated when and why.

Under my approach, one would say this about the government's
position: The government is threatening the applicant with a
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retaliatory firing or withholding of a benefit and, in the alternative,
is asking that he permit the government to prevent him from airing
his political convictions. The prevention is a clear-cut wrong rising
to constitutional levels. The retaliatory withholding of the benefit
or firing is offensive conduct, probably not rising to a constitutional
level. But the threat of a firing unless one lets the government
prevent one from speaking one's political mind carries with it a level
of blameworthiness equal to the actual prevention and not to the
firing. Hence the threat does in fact rise to a constitutional level.
C. Nuclear Deterrence
If it is immoral to do X, is it also immoral to intend to do X? It
certainly seems that way. But a number of cases have arisen to
suggest that this is doubtful. The nation that deters nuclear attacks
by adopting a policy of automatic retaliation is intending the
immoral: It is intending to launch a nuclear strike when little more
than the killing of many innocents in the enemy camp is thereby
accomplished. Some have indeed argued that because it involves
this immoral intention, such a policy would in fact be immoral.
(But they have found it very difficult to sustain this argument-if the
policy really does what it purports to do, deter nuclear war.)
The criminal law's version of this problem is a variation of the
typical spring gun case. Property owner installs a spring gun to
protect some uninhabited piece of property. Should anyone try to
enter the property, he will be mowed down by the spring gun. A
large sign announces to the outside world what's in store for
intruders. If someone enters nonetheless, and is killed by the gun,
the property owner will probably be found guilty of murder or
manslaughter. In other words, he is not entitled to defend property
by the use of deadly force. Suppose however that a burglar, who is
about to enter the property, notices the sign and reports it to the
local prosecutor, who brings charges against the property owner for
attempted murder. He argues that since it would be murder if
someone got killed upon entry, an arrangement that would
accomplish this if an entry were to happen is an attempted murder.
Would he be right? The nuclear deterrence analogy suggests that
he would not.
This somewhat paradoxical feature of intent (and attempt) is a
twin of the blackmail paradox. The blackmail paradox consists in
the fact that the defendant's announcement of a conditional intent
to do X if Y occurs (to reveal embarrassing secrets if he isn't paid
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some money) is illegal even though the doing of X unless Y occurs
would be legal. The nuclear deterrence paradox consists in the fact
that the defendant's announcement of an intent to do X if Y occurs
is legal even though the doing of X if Y occurs would be illegal.
Our solution to the blackmail paradox also seems to solve the
nuclear deterrence/spring gun paradox. The installation of the
spring gun or of a nuclear doomsday machine is not wrongful, even
though it would be wrongful if they actually went off, because the
successfully demanded, not the threatened contingency, determines
the level of blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct. The
successfully demanded behavior in this case is the non-attack of one's
country and the non-intrusion onto one's property, neither of which
is blameworthy by itself.
IX. THE LOGIC OF THE ARGUMENT
I was once told a story about a question Bertrand Russell was
supposedly asked at his post-Nobel Prize news conference. A
journalist wanted to know what logicians mean when they say that
from a logical falsehood anything follows. For example, if we were
to assume that two plus two equals five, would it follow that
Bertrand Russell was the Pope? Russell, unfazed, is said to have
answered: "Yes, indeed. Let us suppose that two plus two is five.
Now subtract three from both sides and you get one equals two.
The Pope and I are two; therefore we are one; therefore I am the
Pope." I am not sure whether the illustration really makes the point
Russell wanted to make. It does, however, seem a nice illustration
of the strange ripple effects odd assumptions in one area can have
in an entirely different area if one is only determined to pursue
them.
Many of the proofs and arguments making up the theory of
social choice are like that. We might be asked to assume (as in
Kenneth Arrow's original "Impossibility" Theorem) that a certain
voter in a community has complete discretion to determine the
relative ranking of some particular pair of alternatives. In addition,
we will be asked to make some utterly innocuous background
assumptions. Then, before we know it, we are shown how the
"mini-dictator" has turned into a Mussolini who controls every
relative ranking of every pair of alternatives. Having started out
with a minor oddity, we have ended up with something utterly
amazing.
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Something like that I claim to be at work with blackmail. The
minor oddity is the fact that the blameworthiness of an action is not
totally determined by how much the victim hates what's being done
to him. That minor oddity then leads to the major oddity of
blackmail-a crime which consists of a bargain which both parties
want to strike and which has no adverse effects on any third parties.
The way in which the minor oddity leads to the major oddity is in
fact quite parallel to the "minidictator" argument in the theory of
social choice. Once we assume that the ranking of certain alternatives is fixed independently of the victim's wishes, we have also
indirectly taken the ranking of other alternatives away from him.
And that means, in effect, that we have taken the right to strike
certain Pareto-optimal bargains out of his hands.

Were I to put my argument in the tiniest of nutshells, it would
go like this: The essence of blackmail resides in a strange, anomalous-looking fact. The defendant manages to leverage the threat of
a mild wrong into a substantial advantage and this leveraging is
deemed by us a very major wrong. The so-called punishment
puzzle-involving an eccentric homeowner who prefers taking a
beating to losing a valuable heirloom-shows why this fact is not so
strange and anomalous after all. It is a natural, but somewhat
counterintuitive, consequence of the fact that blameworthiness is a
function not merely of how much the victim hates the wrong being
done to him, but is also a function of other attributes of the wrong,
such as mens rea, actus reus and so on. The fact that blameworthiness depends on these other attributes implies that situations will
arise in which the victim will prefer to be subjected to a greater
rather than a lesser wrong; which, in turn, implies that the victim's
judgment cannot be trusted to rank wrongs; which, in turn, implies
that a defendant who persuades his victim to accept a bigger wrong
in lieu of a smaller wrong, should in fact be deemed guilty of the
bigger wrong. This is exactly what the blackmail doctrine does.

